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Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever
3HWHU/HH
INTRODUCTION
One of the central insights of economic analyses of patent law is that context matters.1 As
Robert Merges and Richard Nelson observe, patents impact innovation very differently for discrete,
cumulative, chemical, and science-based technologies.2 In general, overly narrow patents will
not provide adequate incentive to develop an invention, while overly broad rights will preempt too
many rivalrous developments.3 The key is to strike the right balance, one where patents induce
WKHFUHDWLRQRIQHZLQYHQWLRQVZLWKRXWXQGXO\VWLÁLQJVXEVHTXHQWDGYDQFHVLQWKHÀHOG4
Among the many potential levers for striking the right balance is patent scope: the amount
of “coverage” afforded to a patent. At an abstract level, patent scope for any given invention
may be construed broadly or narrowly, and there are theoretical arguments in favor of each.
Merges and Nelson enter into this debate, and they are not agnostic. Contrary to “prospect”
theorists who favor broad, early patent rights on inventions,5 Merges and Nelson argue in favor
RI´ULYDOURXVFRPSHWLWLRQµDQGQDUURZSDWHQWVLQÀHOGVPDUNHGE\FXPXODWLYHLQQRYDWLRQ6
The objective of calibrating patent scope is one of the holy grails of patent law: great in theory
EXWGLIÀFXOWWRDFKLHYHLQSUDFWLFH$VDSUHOLPLQDU\PDWWHUVXFKFDOLEUDWLRQUHTXLUHVRQHWR
identify appropriate places in the patent system where actors analyze and exercise discretion
over patent scope. Merges and Nelson consider several, including: 1) patent prosecution,
ZKHUHWKH3DWHQWDQG7UDGHPDUN2IÀFH 372 JUDQWVGHQLHVDQGSUXQHVEDFNYDULRXVSURIIHUHG
claims;7 2) doctrines of disclosure and enablement, in which a patent’s technical disclosure

*

Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. I would like to thank Mark Janis for inviting me to
participate in the symposium entitled “Patent Scope Revisited: Merges & Nelson’s ‘On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope,’ 20 Years After” at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
1. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV.  
2. Id. at 880-908.
3. Id. at 875.
4. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE
L.J. 1590   DSSO\LQJLQGXFHPHQWDQDO\VLVWRQRQREYLRXVQHVVGHWHUPLQDWLRQV 
5. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.  
6. Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 872.
7. Id. at 844-45.
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PD\ GHÀQH DQG OLPLW WKH VFRSH RI FRYHUDJH8 3) and the law of infringement, which can
narrow or widen the effective scope of a patent.9
This Essay explores another mechanism for calibrating patent scope: claim construction.
Claim construction is the process by which judges construe the meaning of terms in patent
FODLPVDQGLWRIWHQLQYROYHVVLJQLÀFDQWGLVFUHWLRQ5HFRJQL]LQJWKHLQKHUHQWLQGHWHUPLQDF\
of much claim construction, this Essay argues that policy considerations should guide this
discretion in productive directions. Where traditional interpretative methodologies do not
yield a clear answer, courts should consider the technological contributions of a patented
invention and the competitive dynamics of a particular industry when construing claims.
$FFRUGLQJO\FRXUWVVKRXOGFRQVWUXHFODLPWHUPVEURDGO\LQOLJKWRIVLJQLÀFDQWFRQWULEXWLRQV
by a patent and narrowly where contributions are marginal or technological development
LQDSDUWLFXODUÀHOGZRXOGEHQHÀWPRUHVXEVWDQWLYHO\IURPULYDOURXVFRPSHWLWLRQ,QWKLV
fashion, “substantive” claim construction can serve as a lever for optimizing patent scope.10
7KLV(VVD\SURFHHGVLQIRXU3DUWV3DUW,EULHÁ\VXUYH\VWKHODZRIFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQ
KLJKOLJKWLQJ ZHOONQRZQ GHÀFLHQFLHV WKDW WKH FXUUHQW SURSRVDO PD\ DPHOLRUDWH 3DUW
II elaborates in greater detail the proposal for courts to utilize claim construction as a
patent scope lever. By considering substantive and policy factors as claim construction
“tiebreakers,” courts can conscientiously construe claims broadly or narrowly so as to best
promote technological progress. While this proposal seems radical, Part III argues that it
ÀQGVVXSSRUWLQWZRUDWKHUGLVSDUDWHSODFHVWKHSDWHQWV\VWHP·VKLVWRULFDOV\VWHPRIFHQWUDO
claiming as well as the Supreme Court’s recent rulings on patent law. Part IV explores the
unique advantages of this proposal and responds to several prominent objections
I.

THE CURRENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION LANDSCAPE

Before proposing any change, it is useful to consider the current law and institutional
framework of claim construction. By statute, all patents conclude with one or more claims,
which are highly stylized sentences “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”11&ODLPVGHÀQHWKH´PHWHVDQG
bounds” of an invention,12 and claim construction—the process by which courts construe
claim terms—often determines the outcome of infringement litigation.13 As we will see,
claim construction is not only very important, it is also highly controversial.

8. Id. at 845-52.
9. Id. at 852-68.
10. Cf. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim
Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY. L. REV.   UHFRJQL]LQJWKHXVHRIFODLPFRQVWUXFtion as a vehicle for implementing patent policy).
86&  
12. See In re :DUPHUGDP)G )HG&LU 
13. See 'LDPRQGY'LHKU86   6WHYHQV-GLVVHQWLQJ .LPEHUO\$0RRUH
Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH.  
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:KLOHFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQLVHVVHQWLDOWRLQIULQJHPHQWDQDO\VLVLWLVLQKHUHQWO\GLIÀFXOWWR
perform. The translation of a novel, nonobviousness invention to written claims is fraught
with indeterminacy. As the Court of Claims, a precursor to the Federal Circuit, famously
noted, the “conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot
EHVDWLVIDFWRULO\ÀOOHGµ147KHGLIÀFXOW\RIFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQXQGHUOLHVVLJQLÀFDQWGRFWULQDO
controversy in this area, much of it centering on who should perform claim construction
and how it should be performed. The following discussion explores the relevant doctrine in
greater detail by examining three key decisions.
First, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. Markman I), the Federal Circuit held,
DQG WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW DIÀUPHG WKDW MXGJHV UDWKHU WKDQ MXULHV VKRXOG SHUIRUP FODLP
construction.15 Second, in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that
claim construction is a pure question of law reviewed de novo on appeal.16 Finally, in Phillips
v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit established a general interpretative framework for claim
construction.176SHFLÀFDOO\Phillips held that courts construing claims should place greater
weight on “intrinsic evidence,” which includes the literal wording of the claims themselves,
WKHSDWHQWVSHFLÀFDWLRQDQGWKHSURVHFXWLRQKLVWRU\UDWKHUWKDQ´H[WULQVLFHYLGHQFHµZKLFK
includes information from outside sources, such as dictionaries, treatises, and expert testimony.
$V HDFK RI WKHVH GRFWULQHV KDV JHQHUDWHG VLJQLÀFDQW FRPPHQWDU\ , ZLOO RQO\ KLJKOLJKW
a few salient points. On its face, Markman’s holding that judges rather than juries should
perform claim construction seems quite sensible. While neither juries nor judges are technical
experts, judges’ specialized experience in construing documents likely renders them better
situated to construe complex patent claims.18 However, Markman’s assignment of claim
construction to judges, and the establishment of separate Markman hearings to construe
FODLPVKDGVLJQLÀFDQWDQGXQIRUHVHHQLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUSDWHQWVXLWV,QSDUWLFXODULWKHOSHG
formally separate claim construction from other issues in litigation, namely patent validity
and infringement. Prior to MarkmanIDFWÀQGHUVFRPPRQO\FRQVLGHUHGFODLPVFRSHSDWHQW
validity, and infringement in an integrated, holistic fashion.19 After Markman, this was no
longer the case.
This compartmentalized emphasis on claim construction has helped harden a system of
´SHULSKHUDOFODLPLQJµZKHUHLQWKHZRUGVRIDFODLPGHÀQHWKHRXWHUERXQGDULHVRIDSDWHQWHH·V
exclusive rights.20 Within peripheral claiming, “legal interpretation of words has taken the

$XWRJLUR&RRI$PHULFDY8QLWHG6WDWHV)G &W&O 
)G )HG&LU  LQEDQF aff’d 0DUNPDQY:HVWYLHZ,QVWUXPHQWV,QF Markman
II 86  
)G )HG&LU  LQEDQF 
)G )HG&LU  HQEDQF 
18. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J.Q  
19. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV  
20. Id. at 1751.
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SODFH RI GHÀQLWLRQ RI WKH SURSHU VFRSH RI WKH LQYHQWLRQ LWVHOIµ21 This elevation of form
over substance leaves little if any room for normative and policy considerations. Thus, in
contrast to Merges and Nelson’s objective of calibrating patent scope, “the result of this
collateral process [of claim construction] bears only a coincidental relationship to the ideal
scope of the patent claim.”22
The Federal Circuit’s de novo standard for reviewing claim construction, established in
Cybor, has also proven highly controversial. In a number of concurrences and additional
views issued in this in banc decision, several Federal Circuit judges argued for some degree
of deference to trial courts.23 Among other considerations, district courts are closer to the
technological facts of a patent dispute and may consult outside resources to aid in claim
construction that are unavailable to judges of the Federal Circuit. Since Cybor, problems
with the Federal Circuit’s de novo standard of review have become well known. These
include:
  D VWHDGLO\ KLJK UHYHUVDO UDWH   D ODFN RI SUHGLFWDELOLW\ DERXW DSSHOODWH
RXWFRPHV  ORVVRIWKHFRPSDUDWLYHDGYDQWDJHRIWHQHQMR\HGE\WKHGLVWULFW
MXGJHVDQG  LQXQGDWLRQRI>WKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW@ZLWKWKHPLQXWLDRIFRQVWUXLQJ
numerous disputed claim terms in . . . nearly every patent case.24
(PSLULFDOHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWVWKHÀUVWRIWKHVHFRQFHUQV$VWXG\FRQGXFWHGHLJKW\HDUV
after Markman found a 34.5% reversal rate of district court claim constructions at the
Federal Circuit,25 which is substantially higher than its rate of reversing district court rulings
in general.26
Phillips and its literalist approach to claim construction have also been widely criticized.
Commenting on earlier cases that ultimately culminated in Phillips, Craig Allen Nard has

21. Id. at 1762.
22. Id HPSKDVLVDGGHG &RPSRXQGLQJWKLVHIIHFWMarkman helped diminish the importance of
the doctrine of equivalents, a historically valuable lever for calibrating patent scope. Application of
WKLVGRFWULQHKDVGHFUHDVHGVLJQLÀFDQWO\DVFRXUWVLQFUHDVLQJO\GHWHUPLQHLQIULQJHPHQWEDVHGRQWKH
OLWHUDOWH[WRIFODLPVWKDWWKH\ WKURXJKMarkman hearings) have exerted so much effort to construe.
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents,
59 STAN. L. REV.  -RKQ57KRPDVClaim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of
Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.  
23. See, e.g&\ERU&RUSY)$67HFKV,QF)G )HG&LU  LQEDQF 
3ODJHU-FRQFXUULQJ  idDW %U\VRQ-FRQFXUULQJ idDW 0D\HU-FRQFXUULQJ
in the judgment); idDW 5DGHU-FRQFXUULQJLQSDUWDQGGLVVHQWLQJLQSDUW id. at 1480-81
1HZPDQ-SURYLGLQJDGGLWLRQDOYLHZV 
$PJHQ,QFY+RHFKVW0DULRQ5RXVVHO,QF)G )HG&LU  0LFKHO
C.J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
25. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.  
26. Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1751-52.
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characterized this inward-looking claim construction methodology as “hypertextualist.”27
These days, entire claim construction disputes revolve around the meaning of words such as
“a.”28 Such a textualist, inward-looking approach to claim construction deprioritizes contextual
factors such as expert testimony and industry dynamics that speak to an invention’s substantive
technological contribution. This literalist claim construction methodology, moreover, cannot even
assert the virtues of certainty and predictability. Claim construction after Phillips is still marred
E\KLJKUHYHUVDOUDWHVDQGVLJQLÀFDQWLQWHUQDOGLVVHQWDPRQJMXGJHVRIWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW29
As a general matter, the current framework for claim construction simply “isn’t working.”30
Perhaps most importantly, it undermines certainty in two ways. First, claim construction remains
highly indeterminate. Claims have become highly technical and formal, and drafting and reading
claims has become an art in its own right with its own particular conventions. Indeed, as John
Golden observes, it is unlikely that an ordinary technical artisan, unversed in these conventions,
can glean much of anything from patent claims.31 Second, even after a district court has issued
a claim construction ruling, the Federal Circuit’s de novo standard of review extends this
uncertainty deep into the latter stages of patent litigation. The district court’s claim construction
is but an opening gambit that has a good chance of being reversed on appeal.32
In addition to these general critiques, the current claim construction framework is
particularly ill-suited for calibrating patent scope. Claim construction has become an
H[HUFLVHLQSDUVLQJZRUGVUDWKHUWKDQDVFHUWDLQLQJWKHVXEVWDQFHDQGVLJQLÀFDQFHRIDSDWHQWHG
invention.33 The current system thus cannot operationalize the insight that optimizing claim
scope requires a thorough understanding of an invention, its technical contributions, and its
VXUURXQGLQJWHFKQRORJLFDOODQGVFDSH0RUHVSHFLÀFDOO\Phillips’ literalist claim construction
PHWKRGRORJ\LVKLJKO\DQWLWKHWLFDOWRFRQWH[W)RUH[DPSOHWKHIDFWWKDWDQLQGXVWU\ VXFKDV
information technology) advances rapidly with rivalrous competition might auger in favor of
construing patents narrowly. However, under the Phillips rubric, such extrinsic information
has little if any place in construing claims.

27. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH.  
1$P9DFFLQH,QFY$P&\DQDPLG&R)G )HG&LU see Burk &
Lemley, supra note 19, at 1753.
29. See Michael Saunders, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J.   ÀQGLQJDFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQUHYHUVDOUDWHRIDIWHUPhillipsDÀJXUHWKDW
LVVRPHZKDWLQÁDWHGDVLWH[FOXGHV5XOHDIÀUPDQFHV 53RON:DJQHU /HH3HWKHUEULGJH'LG
Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction JurispruGHQFH 0DU  XQSXEOLVKHGPDQXVFULSW available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/
SGI,QWHOOHFWXDOB/LIH3RONB:DJQHUSGI VKRZLQJWKDWWKHUDWHRIGLVVHQWVDQGFRQFXUUHQFHVLQFODLP
construction appeals at the Federal Circuit increased after Phillips).
30. Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1744.
31. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to their “Interpretive Community”: A
Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH.  
32. Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1751.
33. Id. at 1745.
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II.

THE PROPOSAL: SUBSTANTIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AS A PATENT SCOPE LEVER

To address these limitations, this Essay proposes reforming claim construction so that it
can better serve as a lever for calibrating patent scope. This proposal would render patent
scope more sensitive to economic and industrial context as well as address several lingering
GHÀFLHQFLHVRIWKHFXUUHQWFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQUHJLPH,QVKRUW,SURSRVHDPRUHVXEVWDQWLYH
holistic approach to claim construction in which courts augment their Phillips analysis by
considering a patented invention’s technological contribution, attributes of the allegedly
infringing device, and the competitive landscape in which these technologies operate.
Where the Phillips methodology does not yield a clear interpretation, I suggest that policy
considerations aimed at promoting technological progress should inform claim construction.
Thus, depending on context, courts should construe terms broadly based on an invention’s
considerable technological merit and the need to maintain strong incentives to invent34 or
QDUURZO\WRIDFLOLWDWHFRPSHWLWLYHGHYHORSPHQWVLQDSDUWLFXODUÀHOG
This new approach could arise in several ways. Most ambitiously, Congress could amend
the Patent Act to clarify that courts should consider an invention’s technological merit,
WKH DFFXVHG GHYLFH DQG WKH FRPSHWLWLYH G\QDPLFV RI D SDUWLFXODU ÀHOG ZKHQ FRQVWUXLQJ
claims. Because legislative action is unlikely,35 however, such reform is more likely to arise
from the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court. Indeed, in some ways, this proposal simply
UHKDELOLWDWHVDQGDGDSWVWZRMXGJHPDGHGRFWULQHVWKDWKDYHKLVWRULFDOO\LQÁXHQFHGSDWHQW
scope: 1) the “pioneer inventions” doctrine whereby foundational advances of high social
value receive broader construction36 and 2) the principle that public notice concerns weigh
in favor of construing claims narrowly where both broad and narrow interpretations are
equally plausible.37 Whatever the mechanisms used, this proposal would shift attention away
from the literal text of patent claims and more toward a substantive appraisal of a patent’s
technological contribution.38

34. Of course, it may seem odd to shore up ex ante incentives to invent with ex post claim constructions. However, this limitation would be eliminated over time as courts developed a track
history of construing pioneering inventions broadly, thus establishing ex ante expectations of broad
coverage.
35. Congress is beset by interest group politics that may discourage such a proposal. Cf. Rochelle
Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1571
 
36. See Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Exchange: The Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO.
L.J.  6LPLODUO\SLRQHHUVWDWXVPD\DOVRMXVWLI\EURDGHUDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH
doctrine of equivalents. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608
 0DUN$/HPOH\The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV.  
37. See$WKOHWLF$OWHUQDWLYHV,QFY3ULQFH0IJ,QF)G )HG&LU 
38. As such, there are clear parallels between this proposal and the European practice of “purposive” claim interpretation, which is neither extremely literalist nor completely divorced from patent
text. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS WKHG 
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To illustrate this new approach, consider a pre-Phillips claim construction dispute, Wang
Laboratories, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.39 In this case, Wang sued America Online for
infringing its patent on an online information display system. A crucial issue was whether
the term “frame” in Wang’s patent claims encompassed only “character-based” display
protocols, or if it also covered “bit-mapped” display protocols, both of which existed at
the time of invention.40 Patentee Wang favored the broader construction while defendant
America Online, whose system used a bit-mapped protocol, argued that “frame” was limited
WRFKDUDFWHUPDSSHGSURWRFROV'UDZLQJIURPWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQDQGSURVHFXWLRQKLVWRU\WKH
Federal Circuit held that a “frame” only referred to a character-mapped system.41 However, the
court integrated its analysis with references to extrinsic evidence, notably inventor testimony
that “Wang had not been able to implement a bit-mapped protocol in the claimed system.”42
While Phillips would downplay the importance of such extrinsic evidence, I argue that it
should have greater probative weight for several reasons. First, it provides a more accurate
depiction of the technological scope of the patented invention. Wang’s awareness of and
inability to practice a bit-mapped protocol suggests that its patent should be appropriately
cabined. While intrinsic evidence is likely to describe what an invention is, it is not likely
to describe what it is not RWKHUWKDQIRUSXUSRVHVRIGLVWLQJXLVKLQJSULRUDUW (YLGHQFHRI
what an invention is not can be crucial to demarcating its appropriate boundaries. Second,
this evidence highlights the clarifying role of the allegedly infringing device in construing
patent claims.43 By providing a concrete basis for comparison, the accused device can focus
and clarify claim construction.44
This proposal for a more substantive approach to claim construction would both effectuate
and necessitate several reforms to the current legal framework. Most fundamentally, it would
encourage a more holistic approach to claim interpretation, integrating claim construction
with considerations of validity and infringement. Additionally, it would increase reliance
on extrinsic evidence, including a wider universe of extrinsic evidence than contemplated
in the Phillips framework. Within that framework, extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries,
)G )HG&LU :KLOHGHFLGHGEHIRUHPhillips, Wang nevertheless exKLELWVDFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQPHWKRGRORJ\IRFXVHGRQLQWULQVLFHYLGHQFHHVSHFLDOO\WKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQ
See Cotropia, supra note 10, at 107-08.
40. 197 F.3d at 1380. In character-based display protocols, the screen is divided into a grid, and the
system places a character in each cell of the grid. In bit-mapped display protocols, the system encodes an image with reference to the individual pixels of a monitor. Id.
41. Id. at 1382.
42. Id.
43. Recent Federal Circuit doctrine has begun to capture this insight. Compare SRI Int’l v. MatsuVKLWD(OHF&RUSRI$P)G )HG&LU  LQEDQF  GLVDYRZLQJFRQVLGHUDWLRQV
of accused products in claim construction), with-DQJY%RV6FLHQWLÀF&RUS)G
 )HG&LU  UHTXLULQJHYLGHQFHRIDFFXVHGSURGXFWVLQFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQ 
44. On a related note, the alleged infringer, who has strong incentives to distinguish her product
from the patented invention, is a valuable source of extrinsic information relevant to claim construction. Thomas, supra note 22, at 167-68.
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VFLHQWLÀFWUHDWLVHV DQG H[SHUWWHVWLPRQ\LVJHQHUDOO\GLUHFWHGWRWKHSDWHQWDWLVVXH0\
proposal would allow judges to also consider extrinsic evidence directed to exogenous
VXEMHFWPDWWHUVXFKDVWKHDFFXVHGSURGXFWRUWKHFRPSHWLWLYHG\QDPLFVRIDSDUWLFXODUÀHOG
Emphasizing extrinsic evidence and policy considerations also suggests a more deferential
VWDQGDUGRIUHYLHZIRUFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQVRQDSSHDO7KH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWMXVWLÀHGGHQRYR
UHYLHZ RI GLVWULFW FRXUW FODLP FRQVWUXFWLRQ EDVHG RQ WKH FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ VRPH ZRXOG
say mischaracterization) of claim construction as a pure question of law. This proposal,
however, explicitly recognizes the factual nature of claim construction, thus lending itself to
more deferential review. While the “clear error” standard for pure factual questions may be
inappropriate, an intermediate standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact may
strike the right balance. Additionally, to the extent that equitable and policy considerations
inform a district court’s claim construction, the relatively deferential “abuse of discretion”
standard for review may be appropriate. Alternatively, a hybrid standard may emerge in which
the Federal Circuit reviews policy determinations de novo while reviewing the underlying
facts informing such determinations for clear error.45 Whatever the precise standard, greater
deference would help ameliorate the lingering uncertainty that currently taints district court
claim constructions on appeal.46
:KLOHWKLVSURSRVDODSSHDUVUDGLFDODWÀUVWJODQFHSURSHUO\XQGHUVWRRGLWLVTXLWHPRGHVW
First, this proposal is intended merely as a “tiebreaker” where traditional claim construction
methodology does not provide a clear answer. This approach does not displace the Phillips
framework; it merely supplements it. As such, it would apply with greater or lesser force to
different technological areas. For example, while chemistry and biotechnology inventions
lend themselves to accurate representation in words, construing claim terms for machines
and software may leave more room for interpretation.47
Second, this proposal merely makes explicit what courts are probably doing anyway. As
seen in Wang Laboratories, courts are likely to consider the accused product when construing
patent claims. After all, claim construction is but a predicate step in an overarching process
of determining infringement. This proposal also parallels judicial intuition to the extent that
an invention that has made a larger technological contribution should be entitled to a broader

45. Along these lines, the Federal Circuit could play a salutary role by reviewing policy determinations and providing high-level guidance to district courts. Given its vast exposure to patent litigaWLRQWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWLVZHOOSRVLWLRQHGWRLGHQWLI\LQGXVWU\VSHFLÀFG\QDPLFVWKDWDIIHFWWHFKQRlogical progress. For example, in the nonobviousness context, the Federal Circuit has indicated that
biotechnology is an “unpredictable art” while computer science is more “predictable.” See Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, ,V3DWHQW/DZ7HFKQRORJ\6SHFLÀF", 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155,
  ,QVLPLODUIDVKLRQWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWPD\EHZHOOVXLWHGWRLGHQWLI\SDUWLFXODULQGXVtries where rivalrous competition and narrow patents are most conducive to innovation.
46. Cf. Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 355, 369.
47. Thomas, supra note 22, at 162.
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construction, a principle that informs the historical doctrine of pioneer patents.48 The following
Part draws upon both historical practice and recent developments in patent law to further
underscore the plausibility and desirability of utilizing claim construction as a scope lever.
III. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY GUIDANCE
As one theme of this Essay is context, it is useful to situate the proposal advanced here
within a historical and contemporary landscape. This Part argues that the current proposal for
VXEVWDQWLYHFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQÀQGVFRQFHSWXDODQGGRFWULQDOVXSSRUWLQERWKWKHSDWHQWV\VWHP·V
historical use of central claiming as well as the Supreme Court’s recent rulings on patent law.
A.

Central Claiming

$VWXWHREVHUYHUVRISDWHQWODZZLOOUHFRJQL]HWKDWVXEVWDQWLYHFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQUHÁHFWV
many of the principles of central claiming. As noted, modern U.S. patent law generally
XWLOL]HV D SHULSKHUDO FODLPLQJ V\VWHP LQ ZKLFK SDWHQW FODLPV GHÀQH WKH RXWHU OLPLWV RI DQ
inventor’s exclusive rights.49 However, throughout much of its history, the United States
utilized a central claiming system that operated very differently. In such a system, the patentee
typically describes one or more representative embodiments of an invention that demonstrate
its central technological core or essence. Patentees then enjoy a zone of exclusivity that
H[WHQGVDVDSHQXPEUDDURXQGWKDWFRUH7KXVFODLPV RUSULRUWRFODLPVDSDWHQW·VZULWWHQ
GHVFULSWLRQ GHÀQHWKH´FHQWUDOµFRUHRIWKHSDWHQWULJKWUDWKHUWKDQPDUNLWVSHULSKHU\
Central claiming is indelibly linked to a more holistic, substantive approach to patent
construction.50 Within such a system, “courts determine how much protection the patent is entitled
to by looking at the prior art that cabins the invention, how important the patentee’s invention
was, and how different the accused device is.”51 This holistic approach encouraged substantive
engagement with inventions and their technical merit and eschewed a legalistic focus on patent text.
According to John Golden, “The protracted historical mixing of patent construction questions with
those of validity, merit, and equivalence provided fertile ground for assertions that a technologycentered, rather than a law-centered, perspective should govern determinations of claim scope.”52
Thus up until recent times, courts commonly integrated claim scope inquiries with
evaluations of a patent’s validity, technological merit, and social worth.53 As Golden notes,

48. See supra note 36.
49. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 70-71
 2QHH[FHSWLRQWRWKLVUHJLPHRISHULSKHUDOFODLPLQJLVWKHGRFWULQHRIHTXLYDOHQWVZKLFK
expands a patentee’s zone of exclusive rights beyond the literal scope of her claims.
50. I use the term “patent construction” to emphasize the integrated, holistic nature of this analysis
that goes beyond simply parsing the words of patent claims.
51. Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1746.
52. Golden, supra note 31, at 362.
53. Id. at 352.
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this practice persisted deep into the twentieth century, well after congressional enactments in
183654 and 187055 initiated the transition to peripheral claiming.56 The well-known Supreme
Court case of Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.57 offers a particularly
cogent example of this more holistic approach to patent construction. There, the Court stated:
,Q DGPLQLVWHULQJ WKH SDWHQW ODZ WKH FRXUW ÀUVW ORRNV LQWR WKHDUW WR ÀQG ZKDW WKH
real merit of the alleged discovery or invention is, and whether it has advanced the art
substantially. If it has done so, then the court is liberal in its construction of the patent,
to secure to the inventor the reward he deserves. If what he has done works only a
slight step forward . . . then his patent, if sustained, will be given a narrow scope, and
infringement will be found only in approximate copies of the new device.58
Similarly, in Cole v. Malleable Iron Fittings Co., Judge Learned Hand rejected a literalist
approach to patent scope by observing that “the interpretation of patent claims depends
more upon the advance made by the inventor than upon the words used.”59 And as recently
as 1966, the Supreme Court integrated questions of technological merit and patent validity
when construing the claims of a patented battery in United States v. Adams.60 Placed in
historical context, the current approach to claim construction, marked by isolation from other
infringement inquires and hypertextualism, represents a break from longstanding practice.61
However, while extolling the virtues of central claiming, it is important to distinguish my
proposal from past practice. Rather than advocate a return to central claiming, I frame my
proposal as an intermediate approach that is situated within the modern system of peripheral
claiming. While central claiming and concomitant claim construction methodologies offer
YDOXDEOHÁH[LELOLW\WKH\PD\ODFNGHWHUPLQDF\DQGIDLOWRSURYLGHFOHDUSXEOLFQRWLFHRIWKH
boundaries of a patentee’s exclusive rights. There is value to be gained from the concreteness
RISHULSKHUDOFODLPLQJ DOWKRXJKDV,H[SORUHIXUWKHUEHORZWKHPRGHUQV\VWHPSURYLGHVOHVV
concreteness than promised). Along these lines, where modern claim construction provides
DFOHDUGHÀQLWLRQRIDFODLPWHUPWKHMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUPRUHKROLVWLFSROLF\RULHQWHGFODLP
construction loses force. However, where this is not the case and courts must exercise
discretion, historical practices of holistic patent construction may prove instructive.

54. 3DWHQW$FWRI-XO\FK6WDW UHSHDOHG 
55. 3DWHQW$FWRIFK6WDW  
56. See Golden, supra note 31, at 349, 353-56.
86  
58. Id. at 63.
)G G&LU 
86  see Golden, supra note 31, at 355.
61. Golden, supraQRWHDW ´8QWLOUHFHQWO\FRXUWVDQGFRPPHQWDWRUVGLGQRWFRQVLVWHQWO\
distinguish between determination of claims’ literal scope—a process today characterized as ‘claim
construction’—and determination of a claimed invention’s equivalents, a process currently characterized as part of the infringement inquiry.”).
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B.

The Supreme Court’s Holistic Turn

7KLVSURSRVDOIRUVXEVWDQWLYHFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQÀQGVVXSSRUWQRWRQO\LQKLVWRU\EXWDOVR
in recent patent decisions by the Supreme Court. At a broad level, a potential objection
to the proposal herein advanced is that factually-intensive claim construction may create
uncertainty and leave too much discretion to district court judges. However, in its recent patent
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has consistently favored holistic standards over formalistic
rules, thus creating a doctrinal climate conducive to substantive claim construction.
As I have described elsewhere, the Supreme Court’s recent re-entry into patent law has been
accompanied by a notable methodological shift.62 Whereas Federal Circuit patent doctrine has
long been characterized as formalistic,63 the Supreme Court’s recent patent decisions have had
a decidedly holistic character. In doctrinal areas as diverse as prosecution history estoppel,
nonobviousness, and remedies, the Supreme Court has eschewed bright-line rules in favor of multifactored standards and broad judicial engagement with technological facts.64 This “holistic turn,”
provides conceptual support for the substantive approach to claim construction proposed here.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements on nonobviousness.
Historically, the Federal Circuit applied a formalistic test for nonobviousness that heavily
emphasized the presence or absence of some “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to create the
patented invention at issue.657KHSUHVHQFHRIVXFKDIDFWRUZHLJKHGKHDYLO\WRZDUGDÀQGLQJ
of obviousness, while the absence of such a factor weighed heavily toward nonobviousness.
In .65,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RY7HOHÁH[,QF, the Supreme Court repudiated the Federal Circuit’s
formalistic application of the “TSM” test.66 In its place, the Court emphasized the “functional,”
´H[SDQVLYHDQGÁH[LEOHDSSURDFKµWRQRQREYLRXVQHVVDULVLQJIURPSULRUSUHFHGHQWV67 Rather
than rely on “precise teachings” from the prior art, courts should consider a larger universe
of more amorphous factors, such as industry dynamics and market demand, in determining
nonobviousness. KSR thus repudiates formalistic, inward-looking inquiries in favor of
holistic standards featuring greater factual analysis and judicial discretion.68

62. Lee, supra note 18.
63. See generally Lee, supra note 18, at 20-41; John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit,
52 AM. U. L. REV.  
64. Lee, supra note 18, at 42-60.
65. See, e.g., In re 'HPELF]DN)G )HG&LU 7KHVRFDOOHG760WHVWKDVEHHQWKH
subject of voluminous academic commentary. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The
Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L.
REV.  53RON:DJQHU .DWKHULQH-6WUDQGEXUJ'HEDWHThe Obviousness Requirement in Patent Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA  KWWSZZZSHQQXPEUD
com/debates/pdfs/Wagner_Strandburg_Debate.pdf.
86  
67. IdDW FLWLQJ*UDKDPY-RKQ'HHUH&R86  +RWFKNLVVY*UHHQZRRG
86  
68. See Lee, supra note 18, at 51-56.
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This “holistic turn” resonates well with the current proposal to inject greater factual and
policy considerations into claim construction. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected
literalist, formalistic reasoning in favor of contextual inquiries. There is a concern, of course,
that these inquiries will raise the information costs of adjudication and overwhelm generalist
judges lacking technical expertise.69 Nevertheless, the Court has implicitly concluded that
achieving accurate outcomes in patent litigation often requires courts to grapple more deeply
with technological facts and context.70 Turning to the proposal at hand, with appropriate
guidance,71 there is reason to believe that district courts can effectively perform substantive
claim construction,72 considering not only the Phillips framework but also additional
contextual factors when interpreting claims.
IV. ADVANTAGES, OBJECTIONS, AND RESPONSES
This proposal for substantive claim construction confers several advantages. First
and foremost, it begins to realize the “holy grail” of calibrating patent scope to maintain
LQFHQWLYHV WR LQYHQW ZLWKRXW XQGXO\ EXUGHQLQJ VHTXHQWLDO GHYHORSPHQWV LQ D ÀHOG  7KH
United States employs a “unitary” patent system that, at least nominally, applies the same
standards of patentability and confers the same bundle of rights to all inventions.73 However,
there is much wisdom to tailoring patent law to particular inventions and industries.74 The
current proposal allows courts to operationalize the economic insight that context should
help determine the breadth or narrowness of particular patents.
This proposal would transform claim construction from a literalist exercise in parsing words
to a substantive examination of a patented invention. In doing so, it would focus attention on
“the issues that really matter in deciding patent scope—the importance of the invention in the
industry, the nature of the technology, how this invention relates to others in producing marketable
products, and the relationship between the patentee’s invention and the accused device.”75
In addition, the present proposal would ameliorate several longstanding defects of the
FXUUHQWFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQUHJLPH7KLVSURSRVDOSXVKHVEDFNDJDLQVWWKHDUWLÀFLDOVHJUHJDWLRQ
of claim construction from validity and infringement inquiries. More substantively, it would
69. Id. at 62-63.
70. Id. at 46.
71. See id. at 62-75.
72. As noted, the Federal Circuit can help guide such claim construction by developing case law
WKDWLVDWWHQWLYHWRWKHYDU\LQJFRPSHWLWLYHG\QDPLFVRIGLIIHUHQWWHFKQRORJLFDOÀHOGVSee supra
note 45.
:KLOHWKHSDWHQWV\VWHPLVXQLWDU\RQLWVIDFHGRFWULQDOGLIIHUHQFHV DQGDIHZVWDWXWRU\H[FHSWLRQV PHDQWKDWLQSUDFWLFHWKHSDWHQWV\VWHPFDQDSSO\YHU\GLIIHUHQWO\WRGLIIHUHQWÀHOGVRIWHFKnology. See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 45.
74. See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT  
75. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 54
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help reduce the lingering uncertainty arising from pure de novo review of claim constructions
on appeal. This proposal takes seriously the factual basis for claim construction, thus
UHTXLULQJDKLJKHUOHYHORIGHIHUHQFHXSRQUHYLHZDQGEULQJLQJJUHDWHU DQGHDUOLHU FHUWDLQW\
to a central issue in patent litigation.
A.

Comparative Considerations

Any proposal for reform must not only articulate its own virtues, it must also address its
relative strengths compared to other potential solutions. At the outset, I do not contend that
claim construction is categorically superior for calibrating patent scope than other potential
levers. Perhaps a multi-pronged strategy involving reforming claim construction as well as
utilizing other mechanisms is ideal. That being said, reforming claim construction enjoys
VHYHUDOVSHFLÀFDGYDQWDJHVUHODWLYHWRRWKHUDSSURDFKHV,QWKHLQWHUHVWRIEUHYLW\,ZLOOIRFXV
on the other “scope levers” discussed by Merges and Nelson: patent prosecution, doctrines of
disclosure and enablement, and infringement analysis.
First, the current proposal exhibits certain advantages relative to relying on the PTO to
FDOLEUDWHSDWHQWVFRSHGXULQJSURVHFXWLRQ7KHÀUVWKDVWRGRZLWKWLPLQJ'XULQJSURVHFXWLRQ
the universe of information about a patent is somewhat limited. Just as secondary considerations
of nonobviousness are likely to become apparent only after a patented invention has been on the
PDUNHWWKHSUREOHPVRIEURDG RUQDUURZ SDWHQWVLQDWHFKQLFDOÀHOGDUHOLNHO\WRPDQLIHVWRQO\
after the passage of time. Courts adjudicating infringement suits thus have access to a broader
array of information than is available to the PTO at the time of prosecution.76 Second, while the
PTO is fairly limited in its resources, litigation will likely motivate parties to provide more and
better information about a patent and its context. Finally, prosecution proceeds without any
NQRZOHGJHRI IXWXUH DOOHJHGO\LQIULQJLQJLQYHQWLRQV77 As discussed, however, the accused
product in an infringement suit can shed valuable light on the optimal scope of a patent.
Second, calibrating patent scope through claim construction enjoys several advantages
relative to relying on doctrines of disclosure and enablement. Enablement and the written
description requirement operate as binary on-off switches: a court either holds that a claim is
valid, or, if the claim exceeds what the patent enabled or described, the court must invalidate
it in full.78 Claim construction, however, represents a scalpel by which court may choose
D QDUURZHU RU EURDGHU FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI D SDUWLFXODU WHUP UDWKHU WKDQ DIÀUPLQJ RU UHMHFWLQJ
an entire claim. Instinctively, one might argue that this violates the well-established canon
WKDW FRXUWV PD\ QRW UHDG OLPLWDWLRQV IURP WKH VSHFLÀFDWLRQ LQWR WKH FODLPV  7KLV FDQRQ
however, is already in tension with the equally well-established principle that courts must

76. Cf. Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV.   
77. Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1782.
78. See, e.g.7KH,QFDQGHVFHQW/DPS3DWHQW86   LQYDOLGDWLQJDFODLPEDVHGRQ
ODFNRIHQDEOHPHQW *HQWU\*DOOHU\,QFY%HUNOLQH&RUS)G )HG&LU  LQYDOLdating claims based on failure to satisfy the written description requirement).
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UHDG FODLPV LQ OLJKW RI WKH VSHFLÀFDWLRQ79 Moreover, it bears emphasizing that under my
proposal, substantive and policy considerations only come into play when traditional claim
construction does not yield a clear answer; given the void that some interpretive gloss must
ÀOOWKHFKDUJHRI´UHGUDIWLQJµFODLPVVHHPVLQDSSRVLWH
Third, the present proposal exhibits certain institutional advantages relative to calibrating
patent scope through infringement analysis. Whatever claim construction’s metaphysical
status as a question of law or a “mongrel practice,” well-settled law holds that judges rather
than juries construe claims.80 Infringement, however, is a question of fact often resolved by
juries. Although open to debate, the implicit institutional competence rationale of Markman I
and II suggests that judges are better suited than juries at construing documents and evidence
of a highly technical nature.81 Furthermore, to the extent that “optimizing” patent scope is
a discretionary judgment infused with policy considerations, such inquiries seem better
suited for judges than juries. These institutional considerations suggest that judge-mediated
claim construction represents a more appropriate context for patent scope calibration than
infringement analysis. Finally, as noted, one of the principal infringement levers for calibrating
patent scope—the doctrine of equivalents—has fallen into disfavor after Markman. This
again suggests that claim construction is a more promising avenue for calibrating patent scope.
B.

Objections and Responses

Of course, utilizing claim construction as a scope lever must address a host of potential
objections. First, critics might object that substantive claim construction would undermine
certainty, predictability, and the public notice function of claims.82 However, the simple
response to this critique is that the current system does not provide much certainty anyway.
According to Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, the current system based on peripheral claiming
has “failed catastrophically” in providing clear notice of the metes and bounds of a patent
right. Furthermore, it bears emphasizing that substantive claim construction is only intended
as a tiebreaker where the Phillips analysis does not yield a clear answer. Additionally, while
WKLV SURSRVDO ZRXOG SUREDEO\ QRW KDYH DQ DGYHUVH LPSDFW RQ H[ DQWH FHUWDLQW\ EHIRUH D
Markman KHDULQJ LWZRXOGVLJQLÀFDQWO\LPSURYHH[SRVWFHUWDLQW\EHFDXVHRIWKHKLJKHU
level of deference afforded to claim constructions on appeal.
At a theoretical level, some might object that this proposal would radically and
inappropriately transform claim construction from a descriptive to a normative exercise.
Put differently, courts should ascertain the objective metes and bounds of a patent rather than
determine some ideal claim scope based on normative and policy considerations. Again,
the status of this proposal as an interpretative tiebreaker where no objective construction is

79.
80.
81.
82.

See Cotropia, supra note 10, at 59.
Markman II86  
See Lee, supra note 18, at 30 n.149.
See Golden, supra note 31, at 323.
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clear should allay much of this anxiety. Additionally, this critique presumes that language is
GHWHUPLQDWHDQGWKDWLWLVUHODWLYHO\HDV\WRGHVFULEH DQGDVFHUWDLQ WKHERXQGDULHVRIDQHZ
technology via written text. Without wading too deeply into metaphysics, I would simply
KLJKOLJKWWKHZHOONQRZQGLIÀFXOWLHVRIWUDQVODWLQJWHFKQRORJLHVLQWRZRUGV83 While claim
construction is supposed to be a descriptive endeavor, the limitations of language frequently
OHDYH SRFNHWV RI DPELJXLW\  ,Q VXFK FDVHV FRXUWV DUH MXVWLÀHG LQ UHO\LQJ RQ QRUPDWLYH
SULQFLSOHVWRÀOOWKHYRLG
Finally, some might object that factually-intensive claim construction would overwhelm
the technical capacity of generalist judges. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, the current
hypertextualist approach to claim construction may decrease judicial engagement with
technology, thus simplifying adjudication.84 As mentioned above, however, the Supreme
&RXUWKDVLPSOLFLWO\H[SUHVVHGFRQÀGHQFHLQWKHDELOLW\RIGLVWULFWFRXUWMXGJHVWRDQDO\]H
technological facts and apply broad standards. Additionally, there is a sense in which
substantive claim construction may be more intuitive than the current framework. While
claim drafting and reading has developed its own specialized jargon, courts already resort to
common sense when literal interpretations lead to absurd results.85
CONCLUSION
Calibrating patent scope based on technological and economic context represents the holy
grail of the patent system. Ideally, patents would confer enough economic power to reward
DQG WKXV HQFRXUDJH  LQYHQWLRQ ZLWKRXW XQGXO\ EXUGHQLQJ VXEVHTXHQW GHYHORSPHQWV LQ D
ÀHOG7KLV(VVD\KDVDUJXHGWKDWFRXUWVVKRXOGXWLOL]HVXEVWDQWLYHFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQDVD
lever for optimizing claim scope. In close cases, courts should draw on a host of contextual
factors and integrate considerations of validity, infringement, and competitive dynamics when
FRQVWUXLQJ FODLPV  &RXUWV ZRXOG WKHQ FRQVWUXH FODLP WHUPV EURDGO\ EDVHG RQ VLJQLÀFDQW
WHFKQRORJLFDO PHULW RU QDUURZO\ ZKHUH WHFKQRORJLFDO FRQWULEXWLRQ LV PDUJLQDO RU WKH ÀHOG
ZRXOGEHQHÀWVXEVWDQWLDOO\IURPULYDOURXVFRPSHWLWLRQ,QWKLVPDQQHUWKHSDWHQWV\VWHP
could help operationalize the insight that when optimizing patent scope, context matters.

83. See$XWRJLUR&RRI$PY8QLWHG6WDWHV)G &W&O 
84. See Lee, supra note 18.
85. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1793-94. See, e.g., Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363
)G )HG&LU cf.65Y7HOHÁH[86   SURYLGLQJJUHDWHU
leeway for judges to exercise common sense in nonobviousness determinations).
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